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THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND
INNOVATION ACT: IS A GENERIC MARKET FOR
BIOLOGICS ATTAINABLE?
KASEY E. KOBALLA
ABSTRACT
The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009
(BPCIA) provides an abbreviated approval pathway for biological
therapeutic products shown to be biosimilar to an FDA-approved
biological reference product. The BPCIA purported to reduce the
price of biologics while promoting innovation. In two recent cases,
the Federal Circuit interpreted a key provision of the BPCIA requiring an applicant to provide the reference product sponsor with
notice 180 days before marketing the product. The Federal Circuit’s
interpretation extends the exclusivity period already provided for
the reference product sponsor, deterring innovation and price reduction. Thus, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one of the cases.
This Note will examine provisions of the BPCIA, discuss
the two recent Federal Circuit decisions, offer an interpretation of
the relevant BPCIA provisions and a proposed stance on the issues
before the Supreme Court, and explain how the current interpretation impairs the potential for a generic market for biologics.
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INTRODUCTION
Biopharmaceuticals, which may be referred to as biologics,1 are a form of medical treatment manufactured in living
systems, including plants, animals, and microorganisms—
differing from drugs manufactured through chemical processes.2
In chemical drug manufacturing, the manufacturing process is
ordered and resistant to change; however, with biologics, “the
product is the process.”3 The processes are sensitive to minor
changes.4 Due to this, “[m]any [biopharmaceuticals] are produced using recombinant DNA technology” and process controls
are specific to manufacturers, increasing the difficulty for a second manufacturer to replicate the product without knowing the
exact process used.5 Combined with the complexity of biologics,
these processes make it difficult to ensure that a follow-on product is as safe and effective as the reference product.6 While the
“bioequivalence of a generic drug” can be established through
blood level testing or other analyses, the therapeutic equivalence
of a biologic can only be proven through clinical trials, and therapeutic equivalence is required for biological products.7

See Ronald A. Rader, What Is a Biopharmaceutical?, BIOEXECUTIVE INT’L
60, 64 (Mar. 2005), http://www.biopharma.com/bioexecutive_article_pt1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SV37-7YQW].
2 How Do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORGANIZATION, https://www.bio.org/articles/how-do-drugs-and-biologics-differ [https://
perma.cc/USE7-WHAZ] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
3 Id. The “product is the process” because the biologics are made through a
live system. Id. The product can be a living entity such as a cell or tissue and
is composed of nucleic acids, proteins, or other natural components. Id. (referring to the process of making biologics).
4 See id.
5 Id.
6 Id. This differs from chemical drugs where it is easy for manufacturers to reverse engineer a chemical compound to make a generic product. See generally id.
7 Id. To be therapeutically equivalent, the drug must be both bioequivalent
and pharmaceutically equivalent. Id. Drugs are bioequivalent if “the rate and
extent of absorption of the test drug do not show a significant difference from
the rate and extent of absorption of the reference drug when administered at
the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental
conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses.” Nomenclature (as excerpted
from the Orange Book), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2, https://www.fda.gov/ohrms
1
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Biologics have proven effective in treating chronic conditions, such as multiple sclerosis, rheumatoid arthritis, and cancer.8
However, the production processes make biologic some of the most
expensive drugs available.9 “In 2013, biologics comprised 28 percent
(roughly $92 billion) of U.S. drug spending, an increase of nearly
10 percent since 2012 ...,”10 and based on past trends, this percentage will likely continue to increase.11
In an effort to reduce the costs of biologics and provide pharmaceutical manufacturers with initiatives to strive continuously
for innovation in biological therapies, President Barack Obama
signed into law the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation
Act of 2009 [hereinafter referred to as the BPCIA] as part of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.12 To balance innovation
and inventor interests, the BPCIA provides a twelve-year exclusivity period for a reference biologic product, preventing follow-on
biologics (or biosimilars) from entering the market during this
period.13 Conversely, the BPCIA stimulates accessibility by delineating an abbreviated pathway for biosimilar manufacturers to
obtain a license for marketability after the exclusivity period ends.14
/dockets/ac/05/briefing/2005-4137B1_07_Nomenclature.pdf [https://perma.cc
/E8B6-LZKQ]. Further, “[d]rug products are considered to be therapeutic equivalents only if they are pharmaceutical equivalents and if they can be expected
to have the same clinical effect and safety profile when administered to patients
under the conditions specified in the labeling.” Id. at 1. “Drug products are considered pharmaceutical equivalents if they contain the same active ingredient(s),
are of the same dosage form, route of administration and are identical in strength
or concentration ....” Id.
8 Donna M. Gitter, Innovators and Imitators: An Analysis of Proposed Legislation Implementing an Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-On Biologics
in the United States, 35 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 555, 557 (2008).
9 See Alex Brill, The Economic Viability of a U.S. Biosimilars Industry, MATRIX
GLOBAL ADVISORS 4 (Feb. 2015), http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/460582
/25983845/1424796699187/MGA_biosimilars_2015_web.pdf?token=lc7oFKdV%2
Bh2Y1RuuLiIHvc%2BQETc%3D [https://perma.cc/Q26X-J4X6].
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 See generally Ude Lu, Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act:
Striking a Delicate Balance Between Innovation and Accessibility, 15 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 613 (2014).
13 Id. at 613.
14 Id. at 614. A biological product is biosimilar to a reference product if it is
“highly similar to the reference product notwithstanding minor differences in
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However, many provisions of the BPCIA remain unclear as to
whom the requirements apply.15
In 2015, the Federal Circuit decided Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz
Inc. [hereinafter referred to as Amgen v. Sandoz],16 interpreting a
provision of the BPCIA that requires an applicant seeking a license
for a biosimilar to give the reference product sponsor at least 180
days advance notice of the first commercial marketing of its biosimilar.17 The Court held that the applicant must provide notice
after the biosimilar is approved for marketing by the FDA when
the 180-day clock will start to run.18 In another recent decision,
Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc. [hereinafter referred to as Amgen v.
Apotex], the Federal Circuit interpreted the 180-day requirement
under a different factual basis, and further, limited the rights of the
applicant by requiring notice 180 days before marketing, despite
that the applicant provided the reference sponsor with manufacturing information to streamline any necessary patent disputes.19
This Note discusses how the 180-day notice requirement should
be interpreted and applied since the requirement is central to both
Federal Circuit decisions and extends the exclusivity period for a
reference product.20
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the BPCIA.21
Part II discusses Amgen v. Sandoz,22 and Part III explains the
clinically inactive components,” if both products utilize the same mechanism(s)
of action, and if the “route of administration, the dosage form, and the strength
of the biological product are the same as those of the reference product.” 42
U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(aa), (IV) (West 2015) (amended 2017).
15 See generally Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
16 See Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d at 1347.
17 See id. at 1347–48; 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(8)(A) (West 2015) (amended 2017)
(referencing a license allowing the biosimilar to enter the market and compete
with the reference product).
18 See Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d at 1358.
19 See Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d at 1066 (explaining where the applicant disclosed information pursuant to provisions of the BPCIA, but did not provide
notice 180 days before commercial marketing).
20 See generally id.; Sandoz, 794 F.3d. at 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). See also infra
Part IV.
21 See infra Part I. See generally 42 U.S.C.A § 262(k)–(l) (West 2015)
(amended 2017).
22 See infra Part II. See generally Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
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holding in Amgen v. Apotex.23 Part IV provides an interpretation
of the 180-day requirement and the most efficient way to apply
it while balancing property rights with innovation.24 More specifically, Part IV will discuss how the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the 180-day notice requirement of the BPCIA is flawed
because the BPCIA expressly provides remedies if an applicant
does not comply with the requirement.25 This Part will also discuss the proper remedy when an applicant fails to comply with
the BPCIA requirements.26 Part V will discuss how the Supreme
Court should address the issues presented in the cross-petitions
for certiorari filed in Amgen v. Sandoz27 and, following the analysis in Part IV, why the Supreme Court should rule in favor of
Sandoz and interpret the 180-day requirement in light of other
provisions in the BPCIA and the policy concerns behind the Act.28
Further, Part V will discuss how the suggested interpretation of
the issues will affect the holdings in both Amgen v. Sandoz and
Amgen v. Apotex.29 Lastly, Part VI will discuss the efficacy of the
BPCIA.30 There are many foreseeable problems within the Act31
and few biologics have entered the market since 2009.32 The
See infra Part III. See generally Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d
1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
24 See infra Part IV. See generally infra text accompanying notes 139–80.
25 See infra Part IV; see, e.g., Brief for Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petition for Certiorari, at 11, Amgen Inc. v.
Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052 (2016) (No. 16-332) [hereinafter Brief for Mylan].
26 See infra Part IV; Brief for Mylan, supra note 25, at 7–9.
27 See infra Part V. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. and Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 582 U.S.___ (2017)
(Nos. 15-1039, 15-1195), 2016 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4470 [hereinafter Brief for
the United States].
28 See generally id.
29 See infra text accompanying notes 241–48.
30 See generally infra text accompanying notes 298–325.
31 Ryan Timmis, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Potential Problems in the Biologic-Drug Regulatory Scheme, 13 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 215, 215 (2015).
32 Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, List of Licensed Biological
Products with (1) Reference Product Exclusivity and (2) Biosimilarity or Interchangeability Evaluations to Date, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda
.gov/downloads/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandap
proved/approvalapplications/therapeuticbiologicapplications/biosimilars/ucm5
49201.pdf.
23
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BPCIA also raises antitrust concerns,33 affects areas of intellectual property,34 and has delayed the entry of generics into the
market.35 Similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act, which has been
amended to minimize loopholes or decrease generic drug approval
times,36 the BPCIA needs clarification from the Supreme Court to
reduce the costs of biologics and provide pharmaceutical manufacturers with stronger incentives to innovate.37
I. THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT
The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009
established a pathway for biosimilars to enter the market and compete with reference biological products to balance consumer interests with innovation.38 The BPCIA provides two pathways for
a biological product to compete with a reference product: either as
a biosimilar or an interchangeable.39 As their name indicates,
interchangeable products can be used interchangeably with the
reference product, and thus have more stringent requirements to be
eligible for interchangeability status after their development.40 The
BPCIA provides the reference product with an exclusivity period
and contains other provisions that balance competitive interests and
inventive concerns, including the 180-day notice requirement.41
A. Licensure as a Biosimilar or Interchangeable
The pathway established by the BPCIA allows applicants to
submit an application for licensure of biological products as either a

33 Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499, 558 (2016).
34 Id.
35 See id. at 559.
36 Martha M. Rumore, The Hatch-Waxman Act—25 Years Later: Keeping
the Pharmaceutical Scales Balanced, PHARMACY TIMES (Aug. 15, 2009), http://
www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/supplement/2009/genericsupplement0
809/generic-hatchwaxman-0809 [https://perma.cc/66WC-FHWK].
37 See generally infra text accompanying notes 265–75.
38 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7001
(b), 124 Stat. 119, 804 (Mar. 23, 2010).
39 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(2) (West 2015) (amended 2017).
40 Id.
41 See generally id. § 262(k)–(l).
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biosimilar or an interchangeable product.42 In the application, the
applicant must include information to prove that the biological
product is biosimilar to the reference product.43 This biosimilarity
must be based on data derived from animal studies, clinical studies,
and analytics studies showing “that the biological product is biosimilar to the reference product.”44 The applicant must demonstrate
that both biological products utilize the same mechanism for the
condition(s) of use prescribed in the proposed labeling and that
those condition(s) of use have been approved for the reference product.45 The route of administration, dosage form, and strength must
be the same as the reference product.46 The applicant must also
show that the manufacturing facility will be safely maintained.47
Demonstrating in lieu of determining eligibility for interchangeability (where a biosimilar product can be used interchangeably with the reference product) as opposed to biosimilarity (where
the biosimilar produces the same result in the same way),48 the
applicant must meet higher safety standards.49 The information
submitted must show that the biological product is a biosimilar
and can be expected to produce the same result.50 Additionally,
if the product is to be administered multiple times a day, the applicant must show that any risk associated with alternating or
switching between the interchangeable biosimilar and the reference product is not greater than any risks associated with using
the reference product alone.51
Generally, an application for a biological product may only
be evaluated against one reference product, and the Food and

Id. § 262(k)(1).
Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I).
44 Id.
45 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(II)–(III).
46 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(IV).
47 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(V).
48 Edward Li, Biologic, Biosimilar, and Interchangeable Biologic Drug Products 6–7 (2016) (background paper prepared for the Am. Pharmacists Ass’n Pol’y
Committee), https://www.pharmacist.com/sites/default/files/files/Biosimilar%20
Policy%20Background%20Paper%20-%20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/TKW4
-R6U3].
49 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(4) (West 2015) (amended 2017).
50 Id. § 262(k)(4)(A).
51 Id. § 262(k)(4)(B).
42
43
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Drug Administration must review the application.52 Additionally,
the risk evaluation and mitigation strategies under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which apply to reference biological
products, shall apply to the biosimilars licensed under the BPCIA.53
B. Exclusivity for Interchangeable and Reference Products
If an application for a biosimilar relies on the same reference product for which a prior biological product has received a
determination of interchangeability, the first interchangeable product has exclusivity for at least a year.54 The Secretary of Health
and Human Services (Secretary) cannot make a determination
until the earlier of: (i) one year after the first commercial marketing of the first interchangeable product,55 (ii) eighteen months
after either a final court decision on all patents in suit in an action
against the applicant of the first interchangeable product or a
dismissal of the action,56 (iii) forty-two months after the approval
of the first interchangeable if the applicant was sued under subsection (l)(6) and the litigation is ongoing,57 or (iv) eighteen months
after approval of the first interchangeable product if there has
been no action under subsection (l)(6).58
In addition to exclusivity for the first interchangeable, the
reference product has a substantial exclusivity period.59 The
applicants cannot submit an application for a biosimilar product
until four years after the date on which the reference product
was first licensed,60 and the approval of the biosimilar or interchangeable cannot be made effective until twelve years after the
date on which the reference product was first licensed.61

Id. § 262(k)(5)(A)–(B).
Id. § 262(k)(5)(C); see 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(p) (West 2015) (amended 2017).
54 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(6) (West 2015) (amended 2017).
55 Id. § 262(k)(6)(A). The Secretary makes the decision of whether a biosimilar
can be used interchangeably with the reference product. Id.
56 Id. § 262(k)(6)(B).
57 Id. § 262(k)(6)(C)(i).
58 Id. § 262(k)(6)(C)(ii).
59 Id. § 262(k)(7).
60 Id. § 262(k)(7)(B).
61 Id. § 262(k)(7)(A).
52
53

2018]

BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION

489

C. Provisions Implicated in Amgen v. Sandoz and Amgen v. Apotex
To allow the reference product sponsor to prepare for litigation (and limit a “race to the court”), the BPCIA provides that
the applicant “shall” disclose to the reference sponsor the application submitted for approval and, thereafter, a list of patents
by which the applicant believes a claim of infringement could be
asserted.62 This allows the reference product sponsor to bring an
action for infringement if necessary, and allows the reference
product sponsor to control whether or not there is litigation.63
If the applicant discloses under the requirements of (l)(2)(A)
[hereinafter referred to as (2)(A)], the reference product sponsor
cannot bring an action for a declaration of infringement, validity,
or enforceability on any of the patents disclosed by the applicant
or the reference product sponsor in the disclosure proceedings prior
to FDA-approval.64 However, if the applicant fails to comply
with the disclosure proceedings, the reference product sponsor
can bring any of those actions.65
Under subsection (l)(8) of the BPCIA, the applicant is required to provide notice to the reference product sponsor no later
than 180 days before the date that the biological product will be
marketed commercially.66 If an applicant complies and after the
reference product sponsor receives such notice, the sponsor may
seek a preliminary injunction before the date of the first commercial marketing of the product.67 This will prohibit the applicant from “engaging in the commercial manufacture or sale of
such biological product until the court decides the issue of patent
validity, enforcement, and infringement ....”68 This is applicable
to any patent that is or is not included in the list provided by the
reference product sponsor or the applicant.69

Id. § 262(l)(2)–(3).
Id. § 262(l)(2)–(7).
64 Id. § 262(l)(9)(A).
65 Id. § 262(l)(9)(B).
66 Id. § 262(l)(8)(A).
67 Id. § 262(l)(8)(B).
68 Id.
69 Id.
62
63
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Once the sponsor seeks a preliminary injunction, the parties
are expected to reasonably cooperate to expedite any necessary
discovery in connection with the preliminary injunction motion.70
However, if the applicant fails to comply with the notice requirement of subsection (l)(8), subsection (l)(9)(B) [hereinafter referred to
as (9)(B)] allows the reference product sponsor to bring an action
for a declaration of infringement, validity, or enforceability against
any patents the applicant discloses or that the applicant recently
received.71 This furthers the goal of expediting entry of the biosimilar into the market and is central to the two recent Federal
Circuit cases discussed in the following two sections of this Note.72
II. AMGEN V. SANDOZ: 180-DAY NOTICE REQUIREMENT
WITHOUT DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The BPCIA provides an abbreviated pathway to negotiate
disputes over biosimilars limiting patent litigation.73 This creates a
“temporary safe harbor from declaratory judgment actions.”74 If a
party fails to participate in negotiation proceedings, the opposing
party may commence a patent litigation action.75 These negotiation proceedings are textually distinct from the 180-day notice
requirement in subsection (l)(8)(A) [hereinafter referred to as
(8)(A)]; however, this case presents a nexus between the two.76
A. District Court Decision
In July 2014, Sandoz GmbH applied to the FDA to receive
biosimilar status for its filgrastim product, similar to Amgen’s
biologic product under the brand-name Neupogen.77 Plaintiffs,

Id. § 262(l)(8)(C).
Id. § 262(l)(9)(B).
72 See generally Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
73 See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 14-cv-04741-RS, 2015 WL 1264756,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015).
74 Id.
75 Id. at *1.
76 Id. at *2.
77 Id. at *1; see Neupogen: Uses, Dosage & Side Effects, DRUGS.COM (July 25,
2016), https://www.drugs.com/neupogen.html [https://perma.cc/TD2W-RC5H]
70
71

2018]

BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION

491

collectively “Amgen,” asserted that Sandoz behaved unlawfully
for two reasons: 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) by choosing to not
engage in the disclosure and dispute resolution process, and 2) by
intending to market its biosimilar immediately upon approval
from the FDA, rather than waiting 180 days after providing notice
to Amgen.78 While Sandoz did not dispute that it failed to engage
in the resolution process, it asserted that it had the right to do so.79
The District Court held that the most reasonable interpretation of (l)(8) favored Sandoz.80 The BPCIA, under the District
Court’s interpretation, provides that “[i]f both parties wish to
take advantage of its disclosure procedures, then they ‘shall’ follow
the prescribed procedures.”81 However, Sandoz did not take advantage of the disclosures, which the Court claims would have
been to its benefit.82 These procedures are only “required” when
the parties “elect to take advantage of their benefits” and are not
required when the party fails to do so.83
Therefore, the Court ruled that it was not unlawful for
Sandoz to give Amgen notice of commercial marketing 180 days
before receiving full FDA-approval.84 According to Amgen’s interpretation of the statute, an extra six months of exclusivity
would have been tacked on to the twelve years Amgen already
can enjoy.85 Furthermore, Amgen requested a preliminary injunction under the belief that Sandoz unlawfully failed to provide notice 180 days before commercial marketing.86 However,
this claim was denied as the Court found Sandoz’s actions lawful, and Amgen’s claims for unfair competition and conversion
were dismissed without prejudice.87
(stating Neupogen is a form of protein that stimulates the growth of white blood
cells in your body. It is used to treat neutropenia (a lack of certain white blood
cells) caused from cancer and by receiving chemotherapy).
78 Sandoz Inc., 2015 WL 1264756 at *5.
79 Id. at *2.
80 Id. at *7.
81 Id. at *6.
82 Id. at *9.
83 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 2015 WL 1264756, at *6.
84 Id. at *8.
85 Id.
86 Id. at *9.
87 Id.
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B. Federal Circuit Decision
Amgen appealed the final decision and the denial of the
preliminary injunction to the Federal Circuit.88 When presented
with the same arguments as the District Court, the Federal Circuit concluded that, when “read in isolation, the ‘shall’ provision
in [sub-subsection] (2)(A) appears to mean that a subsection (k)
applicant is required to disclose ...” the information specified in
the statute. The Federal Circuit further found that the BPCIA
refers to this information as “required” in other sections of the
BPCIA.89 The BPCIA, contemplating that the applicant may fail
to disclose, sets forth a consequence allowing the reference product
sponsor to commence an infringement action.90 This bars the applicant from bringing a declaratory action on patents that claim the
biological product.91 However, the Federal Circuit found that
Sandoz did not violate the BPCIA because this was expressly
contemplated in the BPCIA.92
The Federal Circuit further determined that Sandoz may
not satisfy its obligation to provide notice to the sponsor before
the FDA licenses its product.93 Rather, the applicant may only
give effective notice after the FDA has licensed its product,94 and
Sandoz did not comply with this requirement.95 The Court determined that the “shall” provision in (8)(A) is required because
it “presumptively signals a statutory requirement.”96 The BPCIA
allows noncompliance with the disclosure provisions; however, the
Court held that nothing in the BPCIA indicates that the applicant is not obligated to give the sponsor notice of commercial
marketing.97 Therefore, Sandoz may not market the product before
180 days from the date of notice of FDA-approval.98 The Court

See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1355.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1356.
92 Id. at 1357.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1358.
96 Id. at 1359.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1360.
88
89
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entered an injunction to prevent Sandoz from marketing, selling, or importing the product.99 Because the District Court had
rendered a decision, the Federal Circuit held that the appeal from
the denial of the preliminary injunction was moot and dismissed
that aspect of the appeal.100
C. Supreme Court Response
Following the Federal Circuit decision, Sandoz petitioned for
a writ of certiorari.101 Consequently, Amgen filed a cross-petition
for certiorari.102 The issues presented in Sandoz’s petition were
whether notice given before FDA-approval of the biosimilar application is legally effective, and if not, whether the notice requirement may be enforced by an injunction that delays the marketing of
the biosimilar until 180 days after FDA-approval.103 The questions
presented in Amgen’s cross-petition were whether sub-subsection
(2)(A) of the BPCIA is a required disclosure obligation that may
be enforced by an injunction or whether the only recourse for
failure to disclose under (2)(A) is to commence immediate litigation for patent infringement.104
In response, the Supreme Court called for the views of the
Solicitor General regarding the petitions for certiorari in Amgen
v. Sandoz.105 The Solicitor General’s brief expressing the views
of the United States is intended to help the Supreme Court decide if the lower decision should be reviewed.106 The Solicitor
General recommended granting certiorari and reversing some of
the holdings.107 The Solicitor General did not agree that the
premarketing 180-day notice cannot be given until the biosimilar application has been approved by the FDA.108

Id. at 1360–61.
Id. at 1362.
101 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 2016 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 731 (No. 15-1039), at iïii.
102 Id. at 859.
103 Id. at 67a.
104 Id. at 77aï79a.
105 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2501 (June 20, 2016).
106 Brief for the United States, supra note 27.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 7–8.
99
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D. District Court Decision on Remand
Following the issuance from the Federal Circuit, the parties agreed to lift the stay and Amgen asserted a claim of patent
infringement, which the lower court faced on remand.109 The United
States District Court for the Northern District of California construed the claims to determine if Sandoz infringed Amgen’s asserted patent.110 The Court then sent the case for further Case
Management Strategies.111
III. AMGEN V. APOTEX: 180-DAY NOTICE REQUIREMENT
WITH THE “PATENT DANCE”
Like the discussion of Amgen v. Sandoz in the prior section
of this Note, the dispute in Amgen v. Apotex arose from conflicting
interpretations of the 180-day notice requirement of (8)(A).112
There are factual distinctions in the two cases, but based on the
Federal Circuit’s interpretations, the cases are legally the same
as the rights of the reference product sponsor are extended. 113
While Sandoz did not disclose its biosimilar application pursuant
to the requirement in (2)(A), Apotex participated in the “patent
dance”114 and complied with the disclosure requirements.115

Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 14-cv-04741-RS, 2016 WL 4137563, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2016).
110 Id.
111 Id. at *19. Case Management Strategies allow the parties to meet and
decide if they will agree to settle the case, such as through an alternative dispute
resolution method, or if they would like to proceed to trial. See generally Joint
Case Management Statement, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. and Sandoz Inc. v.
Amgen Inc., No. 3:16-cv-02581-RS (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2016).
112 See generally Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
113 Id.
114 The “patent dance” refers to the disclosure requirements outlined in
262(l). See Connie Ding, Biologics and ‘patent dance,’ LEXOLOGY, Aug. 23, 2017,
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a2acb833-6b80-483c-91fa-63
aeb87dd9b9 [https://perma.cc/Y5S8-E9YH]. The subsection provides a schedule by
which the applicant and reference sponsor exchange information regarding
the applicant for the biosimilar to help streamline litigation. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 262(l) (West 2015) (amended 2017).
115 See generally Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
109
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A. District Court Decision
Like Amgen and Sandoz, Apotex manufactures biologic
therapies.116 Amgen asserted patent claims against Apotex based
upon Apotex’s application for FDA-approval to market a biosimilar
version of Amgen’s pegylated filgrastim product, Neulasta.117 The
parties disputed terms in the patents asserted, and the Florida
Southern District Court construed the claims.118 The District Court
then preliminarily enjoined Apotex from entering the market until
it gives Amgen notice after receiving the license and waits 180
days, following the holding in Amgen v. Sandoz.119
B. Federal Circuit Decision
The appeal to the Federal Circuit did not involve the merits
of the infringement allegations at the District Court.120 Rather,
it delved into the action brought under the BPCIA.121 Amgen alleged that Apotex’s proposed marketing would infringe Amgen’s
patent.122 Amgen moved for a preliminary injunction to prohibit
Apotex from launching the product into the market once it received FDA-approval.123
Apotex failed to give notice 180 days before commercially
marketing its FDA-licensed product; therefore, Amgen sought a
preliminary injunction to enforce the provision.124 Apotex argued,
that unlike Sandoz, it launched the statutory process for exchanging
patent information and channeling patent litigation, and thus, a
different result was required.125 However, the Federal Circuit
116 Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., No. 15-61631-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 2016
WL 1375566, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2016).
117 Id. (stating that “Neulasta and Neupogen are, in the simplest of terms,
biologic therapies which consist of bacterial proteins that stimulate production of white blood cells in patients undergoing chemotherapy and/or stem
cell transplants”).
118 Id. at *5–6.
119 Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
120 See generally Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
121 Id.
122 See id. at 1054.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Apotex engaged in the “patent dance.” Id.
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affirmed the decision from the District Court, holding that “the
(8)(A) requirement of 180 days’ post-licensure notice before commercial marketing ... is a mandatory [requirement] enforceable
by [an] injunction whether or not (2)(A) notice was given.”126 The
Federal Circuit interpreted the word “shall” in (8)(A) to mean
that the directive is mandatory and concluded that there is no
language indicating the notice is dependent on whether the applicant took the earlier step of giving notice under (2)(A).127
Apotex further believes that, under this interpretation, the
(8)(A) requirement would effectively extend the twelve-year exclusivity period by six months.128 However, the Federal Circuit held
that this is consistent with the exclusivity period in § 262(k)(7).129
Section 262(k)(7) establishes the twelve-year date as a minimum,
and as the earliest date on which a biosimilar license can take
effect.130 Therefore, the court held that even when entry is delayed under (8)(A), it is consistent with the exclusivity period,
and as time goes, this will become less of an issue.131
Apotex further argued that the exclusive remedy for violations of (8)(A) should be a declaratory judgment under (9)(B). 132
(9)(B) permits a declaratory judgment action on a patent if the
applicant “fails to complete” any of the several steps required by
the statute, including (8)(A) notice.133 However, the court concluded that this is not the exclusive remedy because (9)(B) states
“that, in certain circumstances, the reference product sponsor
‘may bring’ such an action,” and there is no language excluding

Id. at 1060–61 ((2)(A) notice is the notice requirement to launch the information-exchange process to expedite a patent infringement suit) (alteration in
quotation).
127 Id. at 1061.
128 If the applicant cannot enter the market until 180 days after market
approval, despite that the reference product sponsor has knowledge of the product,
the exclusivity period is extended. Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1061–62 (stating “[b]ut as time passes, more and more of the reference products will be newer, and a biosimilar-product applicant, entitled to
file an application a mere four years after licensure of the reference product,
§ 262(k)(7)(B), can seek approval long before the 12-year exclusivity period is up”).
132 Id. at 1063.
133 Id. at 1064.
126
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other remedies.134 The District Court’s grant of a preliminary injunction was affirmed.135
C. District Court on Remand
On remand to the District Court, Amgen’s infringement
claims against Apotex’s Neulasta biosimilar failed.136 The District
Court found that Apotex did not infringe on Amgen’s patents.137
However, the products have yet to be approved by the FDA.138
IV. STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF THE 180-DAY NOTICE REQUIREMENT
The 180-day notice requirement of (8)(A) is central to these
decisions since both turned on the statutory interpretation of this
requirement.139 However, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in these
decisions is flawed and disregards the Congressional intent behind
the BPCIA.140 The notice requirement should not apply to subsection (k) applicants who launch the “patent dance,” and the notice
requirement should not extend the twelve-year exclusivity period.141
A. 180-Day Notice Provision Applicability
These two Federal Circuit decisions revolve around statutory
interpretations of the BPCIA, which could have larger implications on the biologics market and potentially deter the primary
goal behind the BPCIA—to drive down the cost of biologic therapies.142 The Federal Circuit held that the applicant is not required

Id.
Id. at 1066.
136 See Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., Nos. 15-61631-CIV-COHN/SELTZER;
15-62081-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13919, at *6 (S.D.
Fla., Jan. 31, 2017).
137 Id. at *11.
138 See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, supra note 32.
139 Contra Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See generally Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
134
135
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to launch the “patent dance” and dispute resolution proceedings;
however, regardless of whether the disclosure process was launched,
the applicant is required to give notice of FDA-approval 180 days
before marketing the product.143 The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the 180-day notice provision in Amgen v. Apotex is flawed.144
The Federal Circuit reviewed the District Court’s interpretation of the statute de novo and reached the holding after looking
at both the language of the statute and legislative history. 145
However, the court overemphasized the usual meaning of “shall”
in (8)(A).146 Sub-subsection (8)(A) provides that “[t]he subsection
(k) applicant shall provide notice to the reference product sponsor
not later than 180 days before the date of the first commercial marketing of the biological product licensed under subsection (k).”147
Typically, the word “shall” does indicate that the directive is
mandatory.148 However, as the Federal Circuit explained in Amgen
v. Sandoz, other language can force “shall” to not be a term of
“enforceable compulsory obligation.”149
In Amgen v. Sandoz, the Federal Circuit interpreted the
provision in (2)(A), which provides that “the subsection (k) applicant
shall provide to the reference product sponsor a copy of the application submitted to the Secretary under subsection (k) ....”150
The court found that, when read in isolation, the “shall” provision appears to mean that the applicant is required to disclose
and go through the “patent dance.”151 However, the court held
that the provision “cannot be read in isolation.”152 Because other
sections of the BPCIA contemplate that the applicant might choose

Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d at 1358.
Contra Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
145 See Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1060–61, 1063 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
146 Contra id. at 1060–61.
147 42 U.S.C.A § 262(l)(8)(A) (West 2015) (amended 2017) (emphasis added).
148 See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 123 S. Ct. 748, 769 (2003) (citing
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1598 (4th ed. 2000)).
149 Contra Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
150 See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(emphasis added).
151 Id. at 1355.
152 Id.
143
144
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to withhold the information and, because it sets forth consequences
for such actions, “‘shall’ ... does not mean ‘must.’”153
Similarly, “shall” in (8)(A) does not mean “must.”154 The Federal Circuit held that there was no statutory language that effectively compelled a nonmandatory treatment of (8)(A) to dispose
of Apotex’s argument; thus, (8)(A) was given its plain meaning
to extend the exclusivity period.155 However, this interpretation
is incorrect and would thwart the purpose of the BPCIA as a
whole.156 A principle of statutory interpretation is that the plain
language enjoys a robust presumption in its favor.157 However,
precedent in case law states that “[i]t is a ‘fundamental canon of
statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read
in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’”158 Other parts of the statute indicate that “shall”
is not mandatory in (8)(A).159
Similar to the Federal Circuit’s holding in Amgen v. Sandoz,
another provision of the BPCIA anticipates and provides a remedy
for failing to provide (8)(A) notice when the applicant followed
disclosure procedures.160 Sub-subsection (9)(B) provides a remedy
to the reference product sponsor in the event that the applicant
chooses not to provide notice of commercial marketing.161 This
remedy would be unnecessary if (8)(A) was mandatory for applicants who are in compliance with (2)(A) and the subsequent
disclosure requirements in subsections (l)(3) through (5).162 A

Id.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(8)(A) (West 2015) (amended 2017).
155 See Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
156 Interpreting (8)(A) by its plain meaning and a literal interpretation is
incorrect. Contra id.
157 See FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 638 (1982).
158 Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dept. of Treas., 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)).
159 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(9)(B) (West 2015) (amended 2017).
160 See id.
161 Id. (stating “[i]f a subsection (k) applicant fails to complete an action
required for the subsection (k) applicant under ... paragraph (8)(A), the reference product sponsor ... may bring action under section 2201 of Title 28, for a
declaration of infringement, validity, or enforceability of any patent included
in the list described in paragraph (3)(A) ...”).
162 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(2)–(8) (West 2015) (amended 2017).
153
154
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statute should not be construed so that a clause is superfluous,
void, or insignificant.163 Therefore, the applicant may choose to
not provide notice under (8)(A).164
Further, the Federal Circuit in Amgen v. Apotex held that the
possibility of extending the exclusivity period would not counteract
the purpose of the statutory scheme.165 Thus, the statute should
not be interpreted in light of the facts at hand,166 but this creates
an exclusivity windfall for the reference product sponsor, more
specifically for Amgen in both of these cases.167 The twelve-year
period was established as a “middle ground between innovator
and generic interests.”168 The purpose of the BPCIA was not to
preserve the market for reference product sponsors but, instead,
to balance the interests of innovation and cost competition.169 This
period was intended to be similar in scope and duration to the
exclusivity afforded to innovative drugs by patent protection.170
Requiring 180 days of notice before commercial marketing,
even when applicants launch the “patent dance,” would not promote
the introduction of biosimilars and the interests of innovation.171
This would deter the resolution of patent disputes, for which the
requirement in (2)(A) was specifically included to expedite.172

See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001).
Contra Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1061–63 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
165 See id.
166 See id. at 1062.
167 Contra id.
168 Krista H. Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671,
817 (2010), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2010/01/an
-unofficial-legislative-history-of-the-biologics-price-competition-and-innovation-act
-of-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJ2C-NM4B].
169 Lu, supra note 12, at 614.
170 See Biologics and Biosimilars: Balancing Incentives for Innovation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8ï9 (2009) (statement
of the Honorable Anna G. Eshoo, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, sponsor of the Pathway for Biosimilars Act H.R. 1548, 111th Cong.
2009). For biologics, Representative Eshoo’s bill would have maintained an exclusivity period equivalent to the protections for small molecules under the
Hatch-Waxman Act. Id.
171 See generally Lu, supra note 12, at 629.
172 Carver et al., supra note 168, at 813.
163
164
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Further, it would not provide any benefit to the public or to the
biosimilar market.173
This is not particular to the facts of this case as the Federal
Circuit speculates.174 Rather, other biosimilar applicants may face
this same situation.175 In Amgen Inc. v. Hospira Inc., Amgen asserted two patents involving Hospira’s biosimilar and both expired.176 This decision in Amgen v. Apotex will force Hospira to delay
the commercial marketing by 180 days, even though the patents
expired and Amgen has no exclusivity rights.177 This could continue
to happen as more biosimilar applicants receive FDA-approval
and attempt to enter the market.178 This decision will harm the
public and produce anticompetitive effects.179 Thus, a windfall is
created for the reference product sponsors, which is not supported
by the plain language of the statute or the Congressional intent.180
B. Purpose of the 180-Day Notice Requirement
The BPCIA parallels the Hatch-Waxman Act and its amendments, which provided a statutory generic drug approval process
and established the abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) approval process by balancing public interests.181 The Hatch-Waxman
Act was amended to include a 180-day exclusivity period, but not for
the same interests as the provision in the BPCIA.182 The
Hatch-Waxman Act was amended to incentivize challenging patents
or designing around them;183 however, the 180-day requirement

See generally Lu, supra note 12, at 633.
Brief for Mylan, supra note 25, at 4.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 4.
177 See id.
178 See id.
179 Brief for Mylan, supra note 25, at 5.
180 Opening Brief for Defendants-Appellants Apotex Inc. and Apotex Corp.,
Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2016 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4225 (No. 16-1308), at 18.
181 See generally 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (West 2015) (amended 2017).
182 Carver et al., supra note 168, at 816.
183 The exclusivity period in the Hatch-Waxman Act will encourage manufacturers to design around the drugs, rather than filing for an ANDA, because they
can avoid the exclusivity period. Id.
173
174
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was implemented in the BPCIA to ensure that the “decision-making
regarding further patent litigation is not conducted under time
pressure that will impair its fairness and accuracy.”184
As opposed to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the reference product
sponsor is already incentivized to challenge the patents when they
receive (2)(A) notice, and the notice of applying for FDA-approval
under (2)(A) should provide the reference product sponsor with
adequate notice to prepare for litigation.185 The Federal Circuit
rested the decision on theoretical concerns over a “race to [the]
court”; however, a “race to [the] court” is unlikely to occur as this
case shows.186
Amgen became aware of Apotex’s intention to market its
biosimilar when Apotex provided both pre-licensure notice of
commercial marketing and disclosure information pursuant to
the requirement in (2)(A), and as a result, Amgen was able to take
the steps to protect its legal rights.187 All the information Amgen
needed to protect the rights held in its patents was disclosed
under (2)(A).188 After disclosure under (2)(A), the reference sponsor
should be able to generate a list of patents for which it believes a
claim of infringement could be asserted under subsection
(l)(3)(A).189 Here, Amgen had eleven months to review the biosimilar application and manufacturing information.190 No statutory
purpose would be served by delaying the launch of the biosimilar
product by another six months.191
The Federal Circuit asserted that this will become less of
a problem as time goes by, but this reasoning is flawed as well.192
184 Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
185 Contra id.
186 See id. at 1065.
187 Id. at 1059.
188 Id.
189 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(3)(A) (West 2015) (amended 2017) (stating that
subject to this subsection, “the reference product sponsor shall provide ... a
list of patents for which the reference product sponsor believes a claim of
patent infringement reasonably could be asserted ...”).
190 Opening Brief for Defendants-Appellants Apotex Inc. and Apotex Corp.,
Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2016 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4225 (No. 16-1308),
at 29.
191 Id. at 29–30.
192 Contra Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1061–62 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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The Federal Circuit stated that they “have been pointed to no
reason that the FDA may not issue a license before the 11.5-year
mark and deem the license to take effect on the 12-year date”193
but there is no basis for this statement.194 There is no policy by
which the FDA could provide a license for the applicants prior to
exhaustion of the exclusivity period.195 Rather, the BPCIA expressly states that an “approval of an application ... may not be
made effective ... until the date that is [twelve] years after the
date on which the reference product was first licensed ....”196
The BPCIA was drafted to allow biosimilar applicants to
control the timing of the two stages of patent litigation.197 Therefore, the applicants could choose to resolve any patent conflicts
prior to the expiration of the twelve-year statutory period.198 However, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation requires any second-stage
patent litigation to occur after licensure by the FDA.199 The dispute resolution proceeding allows the applicant to choose to litigate
the proceeding in either one or two stages.200 If all patents are
not litigated immediately, notice under (8)(A) triggers the second litigation, and again, the applicant can control the timing.201
Therefore, the law allows the parties to litigate at the second
stage post-licensure, but that is not required.202 If the Federal
Circuit’s interpretation holds, the applicant would be required to
delay the potential second-stage litigation, which conflicts with
the policy Congress intended to implement in the BPCIA.203

Id. at 1062.
Contra id.
195 See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k) (West 2015) (amended 2017).
196 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(7)(A) (West 2015) (amended 2017) (alteration in
quotation).
197 Brief for Mylan, supra note 25, at 8.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 9 (illustrating that under the statute, the Applicant can choose to
litigate all listed patents in (3)–(5) at one stage, or may choose to narrow the initial
dispute and resolve the remaining patents in a second stage of litigation).
200 Id. at 8.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 9.
203 The BPCIA intended for the applicant to control the timing of the litigation. If the applicant is required to delay the litigation because of the notice
requirement, the applicant loses that control. Id. at 8–9.
193
194
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C. Preliminary Injunction as a Remedy
In both Amgen v. Sandoz and Amgen v. Apotex, Amgen
sought injunctive remedies to enforce the 180-day notice requirement of (8)(A).204 However, a preliminary injunction cannot
enforce (8)(A) in either case.205 When an applicant fails to undergo the disclosure procedures of (2)(A) and fails to provide
notice under (8)(A), injunctive relief is not available for a failure
to furnish notice under (2)(A).206 When the applicant fails to
provide the information required by (2)(A), (9)(C) provides that
the sponsor may bring suit on any relevant patent.207 That is the
exclusive remedy.208
Instead, Amgen argued that it should be afforded the
monetary and injunctive infringement remedies under the Patent Act.209 However, failing to provide notice under (8)(A) does
not constitute an act of infringement, which is necessary to trigger the injunctive remedies under the Patent Act.210 The BPCIA
does provide for injunctive relief, but only if confidentiality rules
are violated.211 The exclusive remedy for non-compliance is to
immediately initiate an action for patent infringement.212
While Sandoz did not disclose as sub-subsection (2)(A)
provides, Apotex followed the BPCIA provisions, but still failed
to provide notice 180 days before commercial marketing.213 Amgen
then sought a preliminary injunction seeking to force Apotex to
comply, and the Federal Circuit granted this remedy.214 However,
this holding is incorrect.215 If an applicant like Apotex participated

See Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
205 Brief for the United States, supra note 27, at 13.
206 Id. at 12–13.
207 Id. at 17.
208 Id.
209 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d at 1354–57.
210 Brief for the United States, supra note 27, at 19.
211 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(1)(H) (West 2015) (amended 2017).
212 Brief for the United States, supra note 27, at 15.
213 Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
214 Id. at 1054.
215 Contra id.
204
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in the “patent dance,” but chose to not provide notice under (8)(A),
the statute allows the sponsor to bring a declaratory injunction,
not a preliminary injunction.216 If the applicant provided notice,
the sponsor could bring a preliminary injunction under (8)(B),
but those are not the facts here.217
A declaratory judgment is the express remedy Congress
provides for failing to provide premarket notice.218 However, the
Federal Circuit granted Amgen an “extra-statutory” remedy when it
upheld the preliminary injunction to compel premarketing notice.219 Congress did not expressly forbid any “extra-statutory”
remedies, but “where a statute expressly provides a remedy,
courts must be especially reluctant to provide additional remedies.”220 Section 262(l)(8)(B) allows the sponsor to “‘seek a preliminary injunction prohibiting the subsection (k) applicant from
engaging in the commercial manufacture or sale of such biological product’ based on any patent listed in the initial exchanges
during the ‘patent dance’ but not selected for litigation.”221
Therefore, Congress did not intend for the preliminary injunction remedy to always be available since (8)(B) applies when the
applicant provided notice.222 Rather, (9)(B) provides the remedy
for failure to comply with the notice requirement, and Amgen
should have sought a declaratory judgment action.223
V. SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF CROSS-PETITIONS FOR
CERTIORARI IN AMGEN V. SANDOZ
On December 12, 2016, the Supreme Court denied certiorari
in Amgen v. Apotex, which clarified the Federal Circuit’s earlier

Brief for Mylan, supra note 25, at 15.
Id. at 15–16.
218 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(8)(A) (West 2015) (amended 2017).
219 Brief for Mylan, supra note 25, at 16.
220 Id. at 16 (quoting Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps., Local 1263,
489 U.S. 527, 533 (1989) (citing Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979)) (internal quotations omitted).
221 Id. at 18–19.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 15.
216
217
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decision in Amgen v. Sandoz.224 However, on January 13, 2017,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the earlier decision and
will decide on the issues presented in the cross-petitions.225
A. Issues Presented in Sandoz’s Petition
Sandoz presented two issues in the petition for certiorari:
(a) whether notice of commercial marketing under Subsection
(l)(8)(A) is legally effective if it is given before Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval of the biosimilar application,
and, if not, (b) whether Subsection (l)(8)(A) is a stand-alone
requirement that may be enforced by means of an injunction
that delays the marketing of the biosimilar until 180 days after FDA approval.226

The Federal Circuit’s interpretation in the case is incorrect. 227
Section 262(l)(8)(B) allows the applicant to provide the reference
product sponsor with notice of commercial marketing 180 days before FDA-approval.228 It merely requires that notice is given “not
later than 180 days before th[at] date.”229 The Federal Circuit
overemphasized the word “licensed” in the phrase requiring that
the notice must be given 180 days before “the date of the first
commercial marketing of the biological product licensed under
[subsection] (k).”230 Therefore, the Supreme Court should overturn the current interpretation of the notice requirement.231
Further, as discussed in Section IV.C of this Note, there is
no private right of action for injunctive relief to enforce the requirement in (8)(A).232 Rather, if proper notice is not given, the
course contemplated by the BPCIA is to commence an action for

Apotex Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 2016 U.S. LEXIS 7478 (No. 16-332) (Dec. 12,
2016).
225 Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 2017 U.S. LEXIS 692 (No. 15-1039) (Jan. 13,
2017).
226 Brief for the United States, supra note 27, at (I).
227 See generally id.
228 Id. at 13.
229 Id. at 14 (alteration in quotation).
230 Id. (emphasis added) (alteration in quotation).
231 Id.
232 Id. at 20.
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patent infringement.233 However, this issue would not affect the
case on appeal because Sandoz has begun to market the product.234
B. Issues Presented in Amgen’s Petition
Following Sandoz’s petition, Amgen filed a conditional
cross-petition presenting the question of “[(a)] whether Subsection (l)(2)(A) creates a binding disclosure obligation that a court
may enforce by injunction, or [(b)] whether the sponsor’s sole
recourse for the applicant’s failure to disclose the information is
the right, prescribed elsewhere in the BPCIA, to commence an
intermediate action for patent infringement.”235
Like the argument in response to Sandoz’s petition, the
BPCIA contemplates a course of action if the applicant chooses
to forego the disclosure procedures in sub-subsection (2)(A).236
(2)(A) poses a mandatory condition to invoke subsection 262(l)’s
patent-dispute proceedings.237 An injunction is not available to
compel compliance with the conditions set forth in the BPCIA.238
Rather, the sponsor can file an infringement suit.239 Thus, information the reference product sponsor seeks may only be obtained during discovery, not through a preliminary injunction.240
C. Effect on Amgen v. Apotex
If the Supreme Court adopts the proposed stance on the
issues in the cross-petitions, the holding in Amgen v. Apotex will
be affected.241 Despite that Apotex has not given Amgen 180

See supra text accompanying notes 208–12.
Elaine Schattner, Why The FDA Panel’s Nod To Sandoz’s Filgrastim
(Zarzio) Is Good News For Patients, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/sites/elaine
schattner/2015/01/07/the-fdas-approval-of-zarzio-is-good-news-for-patients/#
2425b8224797 [https://perma.cc/7DPG-TWSN] (last updated Mar. 8, 2015).
235 Brief for the United States, supra note 27, at (I).
236 Id. at 21.
237 Id. (“[T]he only consequences for failing to satisfy th[e] conditions are
those expressly set forth by Congress in the BPCIA.”)
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 20–21.
241 See Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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days of notice before commercial marketing, Apotex effectively
provided Amgen with notice of commercial marketing.242 Amgen
would argue that Apotex has not provided Amgen with any “legally effective” notice; however, the disclosure procedures in (2)(A)
effectively provide notice to Amgen.243 This is notice that Apotex
is seeking FDA-approval and, hence, that Apotex will soon begin
to market the product.244
Further, the policy reasons for allowing notice
pre-FDA-approval would support this stance.245 The BPCIA addressed “[t]he timing of biosimilars’ entry onto the market ....”246
Because the BPCIA provides “exclusivity periods, it is particularly
unlikely that Congress would have further delayed biosimilars’
marketing in such an indirect manner.”247 Apotex and Amgen completed the “patent dance,” and Apotex should not face the anticompetitive effects of the Federal Circuit decision.248
In the decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed the District
Court’s grant of a preliminary injunction for failing to provide
180 days of notice before commercial marketing.249 Under the
interpretation proposed above, the injunction is invalid. There is
no cause of action “under which a sponsor could obtain injunctive relief if the applicant fails to give notice” under (8)(A) if the
applicant does not provide the information required by subsection (l)(2)(A).250
If the applicant discloses the information required by
(l)(2)(A), (9)(B) permits a declaratory judgment action on a patent if the applicant “fails to complete” any of the several steps
required by the statute, including (8)(A) notice.251 The Federal
Circuit concluded that this is not the exclusive remedy because

See supra text accompanying notes 185–91.
See supra text accompanying notes 185–91.
244 See supra text accompanying notes 185–91.
245 Brief for the United States, supra note 27, at 15.
246 Id. at 14–15.
247 Id. at 15.
248 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Apotex Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 591
(2016) (No. 16-332), 2016 WL 4921167, at 2.
249 Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
250 Brief for the United States, supra note 27, at 14.
251 Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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(9)(B) states “that, in certain circumstances, the reference product sponsor ‘may bring’ such an action,” and there is no language
excluding other remedies.252 This holding is incorrect253 because
the BPCIA expressly provides for an exclusive remedy, a declaratory judgment.254 Similar to the analysis of Amgen v. Sandoz
where patent-litigation is the sole remedy for failure to comply
with (l)(2)(A), a declaratory judgment is the sole remedy for failing to provide premarketing notice.255 Because the biosimilar
product has yet to gain FDA-approval, the pending suit will not
likely deter market entry if Apotex complies with the 180-day
notice requirement after FDA-approval.256
VI. EFFICACY OF THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND
INNOVATION ACT
As stated above, the BPCIA was enacted to decrease the
price of biologics while still promoting innovation and research.257 However, like the Hatch-Waxman Act, the legislation
the BPCIA was modeled after, there are problems within the
BPCIA that need to be addressed to avoid unnecessary litigation, which has already occurred.258
A. Foreseeable Problems Within the Statute
As discussed in Section I.B of this Note, the BPCIA creates a twelve-year exclusivity period for the reference drug and an
exclusivity period for the first interchangeable biosimilar.259 These
long exclusivity periods will likely inhibit the development of

Id.
Contra id.
254 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(9)(B) (West 2015) (amended 2017).
255 See supra text accompanying notes 218–23.
256 See Jenny Shmuel & Tasha M. Francis, Amgen Loses BPCIA Suit
Against Apotex’s Neulasta® and Neupogen® Biosimilars, FISH LITIGATION BLOG
(Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.fr.com/fish-litigation/amgen-apotex-neulasta-neu
pogen-biosimilars/ [https://perma.cc/69MH-67T3].
257 Timmis, supra note 31, at 226.
258 See id.
259 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(6)–(7) (West 2015) (amended 2017).
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biosimilars and interchangeables alike.260 The twelve-year exclusivity period for the reference drug (before the first biosimilar
can be approved) includes a four-year period of data exclusivity,
which prohibits the filing of biosimilar applications.261 Similarly,
the exclusivity period for the first interchangeable can range
from twelve to forty-two months, again posing a barrier to market entry for a biosimilar.262 In contrast to the BPCIA, the
Hatch-Waxman Act provides only a five-year exclusivity period
for new chemical drugs and a three-year exclusivity period for
new chemical investigations of small-molecule drugs.263 These
longer exclusivity periods will cause prices of both biosimilars
and interchangeables to remain higher for a longer period of
time, countering the goals behind the expedited process.264
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides exclusivity for a period
of only 180 days following the first commercial marketing efforts
from an applicant for the generic drug.265 This exclusivity period
is half of the duration of the minimal exclusivity period for interchangeables under the BPCIA. Some may believe that this
difference will “provide a ... catalyst for competition, hastening the
entry of additional [biologic] drugs to the market”266 because the
Hatch-Waxman Act contained loopholes which allowed applicants to prevent additional generics from entering the market.267
The FDA implemented the exclusivity periods on a first-to-file

See Timmis, supra note 31, at 228.
Id.
262 Id.
263 Id. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, full new drug applications receive five
years of exclusivity for a new chemical entity drug product that has never been
approved by the FDA. However, only a three-year exclusivity period is granted
for a drug product that contains an active molecule that has been previously
approved. Emerging Health Care Issues: Follow-On Biologic Drug Competition, FED. TRADE COMM’N at 27 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/reports/emerging-health-care-issues-follow-biologic-drug-competi
tion-federal-trade-commission-report/p083901biologicsreport.pdf [https://perma
.cc/6G62-8WUP].
264 Timmis, supra note 31, at 228.
265 Id. (stating “[i]n other words, the first person to complete an ANDA
gets 180 days of exclusivity dating from when she first begins marketing”).
266 Id.
267 Id.
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basis and, therefore, first applicants could toll this period by
choosing to delay marketing of the product.268 In contrast, this
“anticompetitive behavior” seems impossible under the BPCIA
because the first interchangeable can either choose to not enter
the market for eighteen months and accept payment or, in the
alternative, not enter the market for forty-two months while patent
litigation ensues.269
However, the Federal Circuit’s current interpretation of
the 180-day exclusivity period for biosimilars under the BPCIA
allows this type of anticompetitive behavior.270 The twelve-year
exclusivity period can be extended as the FDA cannot approve a
biosimilar until the twelve-year exclusivity period is exhausted,
extending the exclusivity period for six months.271 Because the
notice provision triggers second-stage litigation and the applicant cannot begin second-stage litigation until the applicant
receives FDA-approval, the reference sponsor will not compete
with the biosimilar until the litigation has commenced.272
This anticompetitive behavior counters the purpose of the
BPCIA.273 Biosimilars will enter the market later and the reference
product sponsor will not have more time to adjudicate patent rights
without rushing to court.274 This effect will lessen the emergence
of multiple biosimilars on top of the long exclusivity periods.275
B. Biosimilar vs. Interchangeable
As discussed in Section I.A of this Note, a biosimilar product
can be used interchangeably with the reference product, as an
interchangeable, rather than biosimilar,276 if more safety standards
are met.277 This means that the interchangeable product “can be

Id. at 229.
Id.
270 See Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1062–64 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
271 See supra text accompanying notes 185–91.
272 See supra text accompanying notes 185–91.
273 Timmis, supra note 31, at 229.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 231.
276 Li, supra note 48.
277 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(2)(B) (West 2015) (amended 2017).
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expected to produce the same clinical result as the reference
product in any given patient ....”278 Additionally,
if the biological product is administered more than once to an
individual, the risk in terms of safety or diminished efficacy of
alternating or switching between the use of the biological product and reference product is not greater than the risk of using
the reference product without such alteration or switch.279

This is a very “difficult” classification to obtain in comparison to biosimilarity.280 The FDA has not yet adopted regulations
for determining interchangeability; however, it has distributed a
guidance document as notice with opportunity to comment.281 The
guidance document expressly states that the data and information
needed to support interchangeability are “beyond that needed to
demonstrate biosimilarity.”282 The document lists factors which
determine the amount of data and information needed to support
interchangeability as there are multiple influences which vary
with the product.283 Additionally, the document concedes that current analytical methodologies may not even determine or characterize the relevant differences between the reference product and
the interchangeable.284
This document alone shows that interchangeability will not
be utilized by most biosimilar manufacturers.285 The trials and
analyses would likely be unduly burdensome and costly,286 intensifying the delayed emergence of biosimilars.287 Studies from other
countries “with analogous biosimilar-interchangeable regulatory

Li, supra note 48.
Id.
280 Id.
281 See generally Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Considerations in Determining Interchangeability With a Reference Product: Guidance
for Industry, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.fda.gov
/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UC
M537135.pdf.
282 Id. at 5.
283 Id. at 5–9.
284 Id. at 6.
285 See generally id.
286 Timmis, supra note 31, at 230.
287 Id.
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systems further indicate that those seeking interchangeable
approval are likely facing an uphill battle.”288 As of 2012, the
European Medicines Agency, serving a similar role as the FDA
in the European Union, had approved six biosimilars, but no interchangeables.289
With chemical drugs, generic drugs can automatically be
substituted by a pharmacist without physician approval, which
allows the generic to gain market share more quickly.290 This
trend continues as more generics enter the market, further promoting competition and lowering the cost of pharmaceuticals.291
However, biosimilars need to qualify as an interchangeable to
receive this same automatic substitution.292 Therefore, the biosimilar manufacturers cannot bypass the physician without undergoing the additional burden of reaching interchangeable status.293
Uncertainties about the interchangeables, in addition to increased
marketing expenditures, would pose a greater burden on manufacturers.294 Few incentives would exist for the physicians to
prescribe a new drug if there is a fear the patients may react
differently to a critical method of treatment.295 Furthermore,
state substitution laws for the interchangeables may not be as
favorable as they are for pharmaceutical generics.296 In addition
to the stricter standards, this would further discourage biosimilar manufacturers from utilizing interchangeability.297
C. Market Effects of the Abbreviated Approval Pathway
As explained above, provisions of the BPCIA detract from
its statutory purposes.298 Few biosimilars will achieve interchangeability status and few biosimilars will enter the market
Id.
Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 231.
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 Darren S. Tucker & Gregory F. Wells, Emerging Competition Issues Involving Follow-On Biologics, 29 ANTITRUST 100, 102 (2014).
297 See id.
298 See supra text accompanying notes 259–75.
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quickly to drive the cost of biologic therapies down.299 Statistics
from the FDA support these conclusions.300 Since the implementation of the BPCIA, only four biosimilars have entered the market,
and no biosimilars have achieved interchangeability.301 Notwithstanding, the purposes of the BPCIA have been promoted by the
few biosimilars that have entered the market.302
For example, Zarxio, a biosimilar to Amgen’s Neupogen
product, subject of the litigation in Amgen v. Sandoz, received
market approval on March 6, 2015.303 Less than a year later,
Amgen reported that its year-on-year worldwide sales of Neupogen
dropped 4 percent and full-year sales dropped 9 percent because
of competition in the United States and unfavorable changes in
foreign exchange rates.304 The revenue from Neupogen in the
United States fell 11 percent in 2015.305 However, Zarxio was only
sold at a 15 percent discount when it was first marketed.306 Some
doctors may not feel that this saving is worth the risk, but as time
goes on, this could “subside as biosimilar drugs become more commonplace.”307
After Zarxio kick-started the biosimilar movement, sales for
Inflectra, the second biosimilar approved for sale in the United
States, launched in November 2016308 at a 15 percent discount of

See supra text accompanying notes 285–89.
See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, supra note 32.
301 Id. (showing those are Inflectra, Zarxio, Erelzi, Amjevita).
302 Dan Stanton, First U.S. biosimilar gradually eroding Amgen’s market
share, Sandoz, BIOPHARMA-REPORTER.COM (Jan. 29, 2016, 3:14 PM), http://
www.biopharma-reporter.com/Markets-Regulations/Sandoz-s-biosimilar-Zarxio
-gradually-eroding-Amgen-s-Neupogen-sales [https://perma.cc/3XPX-GBPN].
303 Schattner, supra note 234.
304 Dan Stanton, U.S. biosimilars in 2016: Where we’re at following Zarxio’s
breakthrough, BIOPHARMA-REPORTER.COM (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.biopharma
-reporter.com/Markets-Regulations/US-biosimilars-in-2016-Where-we-re-at-follow
ing-Zarxio-s-breakthrough [https://perma.cc/KMJ9-QRQ4].
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Beth Snyder Bulik, For Inflectra Launch, Pfizer Uses ‘Hybrid Model’ to
Home in on HCPs, FIERCEPHARMA (Dec. 19, 2016, 8:21 AM), http://www.fierce
pharma.com/marketing/pfizer-s-inflectra-biosimilar-launch-marks-new-go-to-mar
ket-strategy [https://perma.cc/5WYT-JF3S].
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the reference product,309 hoping for the same success as Zarxio.
However, the nature of this biologic could deter market growth.310
Oncologists in Europe had used the reference product for
Zarxio for almost a decade before Zarxio was approved as a biosimilar.311 The reference product for Inflectra has only been used
for a couple of years.312 Rheumatologists and gastroenterologists
may be more hesitant to uptake the product. 313 Additionally,
Inflectra was not tested in gastroenterology patients, but rheumatologists have much more clinical data to depend on, and thus,
sales may not be curtailed.314 This puts Johnson & Johnson’s $5.9
billion in projected sales of the reference product in 2017 at risk.315
Both Zarxio and Inflectra have entered the market despite ongoing patent disputes.316 Launching the products before
dispute resolution puts the manufacturers at risk for triple damages
if they are found in violation of the patents.317 Manufacturers of the
other two biosimilars have been hesitant to take this same risk.318

309 Eric Sagonowsky, Pfizer loads up for Remicade biosim launch, with
$4.5B J&J brand in its sights, FIERCEPHARMA (last updated on Oct. 18, 2016,
11:00 AM), http://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/despite-ongoing-patent-dis
pute-pfizer-announces-inflectra-u-s-launch [https://perma.cc/W9LV-HXXV].
310 Nicole Gray, Why Inflectra may face greater challenges than Zarxio in
winning over U.S. docs, BIOPHARMADIVE (Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.bio
pharmadive.com/news/why-inflectra-may-face-greater-challenges-than-zarxio
-in-winning-over-us-do/418206/ [https://perma.cc/N3NC-V8GU].
311 Id. (noting that the product is prescribed by oncologists).
312 Id.
313 Id. (noting that the product is prescribed by rheumatologists and gastroenterologists).
314 Id.
315 Tracy Staton, Top of 2017’s pharma heap? Pfizer, Novartis, Roche—and
7 drugs headed for biosim attack, FIERCEPHARMA (Dec. 8, 2016, 10:16 AM),
http://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/biosim-threats-coming-fast-for-world-s
-top-2017-drugs [https://perma.cc/Z7SJ-KL4X].
316 Kevin E. Noonan, Sandoz’ NEUPOGEN® Biosimilar Now on the Market, PATENT DOCS (Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.patentdocs.org/2015/09/Sandoz
-neupogen-biosimilar-now-on-the-market.html [https://perma.cc/PL78-GSAP];
Sagonowsky, supra note 309.
317 Sagonowsky, supra note 309.
318 Amgen: Unlikely to Launch AMJEVITA® Biosimilar Before 2018, GOODWIN:
BIG MOLECULE WATCH (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.bigmoleculewatch.com/2016/10
/28/amgen-unlikely-to-launch-amjevita-biosimilar-before-2018/ [https://perma.cc
/2PX4-W5ZQ].

516 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:479
Sandoz’s Erelzi, a biosimilar for Enbrel, received FDA-approval
in August 2016, but sales will not likely launch until mid-2017.319
Amjevita, Amgen’s biosimilar to AbbVie’s Humira product, received FDA-approval in September 2016; however, sales will not
likely launch until 2018.320 These two products demonstrate that
the need for innovation at a lower cost will not be met under the
current judicial interpretation of the BPCIA.321
As indicated over the past four years and by the market data
above, fewer biologics are expected to enter the market as biosimilars due to the significant development costs.322 Biosimilars
take around eight to ten years and $100–$250 million to develop,
while generic small-molecule pharmaceuticals only cost around $5
million.323 If manufacturers will have to face extended periods of
litigation due to the Federal Circuit decision in Amgen v. Sandoz
and delayed market entry after FDA-approval (and potentially
triple damages if the products are found to be infringing), there
are few incentives to pursue biosimilarity.324 The Supreme Court’s
upcoming decision could potentially increase these incentives.325
CONCLUSION
This Note disagrees with the Federal Circuit’s holdings in
both Amgen v. Sandoz and Amgen v. Apotex.326 The BPCIA anticipates that applicants will not go through the disclosure and
information sharing process to minimize litigation and streamline
disputes since the BPCIA provides a remedy to the reference
product sponsor if the applicant fails to comply.327 However, if

John Miller, Novartis Bid to Sell New Biosimilar Crimped by U.S.
Court Battles, REUTERS (Aug. 31, 2016, 6:40 AM), http://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/us-novartis-fda-biosimilars-idUSKCN11619F [https://perma.cc/282R-9H6Y].
320 See GOODWIN: BIG MOLECULE WATCH, supra note 318.
321 See, e.g., id.
322 Tucker & Wells, supra note 296, at 101–02.
323 Id. at 102.
324 See supra text accompanying notes 270–75.
325 See supra text accompanying notes 226–40.
326 Contra Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
327 See supra text accompanying notes 241–50 for a discussion of the remedy for failing to comply with the disclosure requirements.
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applicants streamline this process, and do comply, the reference
product sponsor effectively has notice of the potential marketability of the product.328 The 180-day notice provision should not
apply to applicants who have disclosed pursuant to (2)(A).329
Furthermore, the BPCIA contemplates a course of action
if the applicant chooses to forego the disclosure procedures in
(2)(A).330 An injunction is not available to compel compliance
with the procedures.331 Rather, the sponsor can file an infringement suit.332 Thus, information the reference product sponsor seeks
may only be obtained during discovery, not through a preliminary injunction.333
Additionally, (8)(A) allows the applicant to provide the
reference product sponsor with notice of commercial marketing
180 days before FDA-approval.334 Section (8)(A) only requires that
notice is given no later than 180 days before the date of commercial marketing.335 Requiring the applicant to provide notice after
FDA-approval would unnecessarily extend the exclusivity period
for the reference product sponsor for six months,336 and the applicant would face anticompetitive effects.337
There is no private right of action for injunctive relief to
enforce this requirement in (8)(A).338 If proper notice is not given, the course contemplated by the BPCIA is to commence an
action for a declaration of infringement, validity, or enforceability.339 Therefore, the Supreme Court should overturn the current
interpretation of the notice requirement and the remedies for
non-compliance in answering the cross-petitions for certiorari in
Amgen v. Sandoz.340
See supra text accompanying notes 185–91.
See supra text accompanying notes 185–91.
330 See supra text accompanying notes 205–08.
331 See supra text accompanying notes 205–08.
332 See supra text accompanying notes 205–08.
333 See supra text accompanying notes 205–08.
334 See supra text accompanying notes 228–31.
335 See supra text accompanying notes 228–31.
336 See supra text accompanying notes 228–31.
337 See supra text accompanying notes 270–71.
338 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(9)(A) (West 2015) (amended 2017).
339 Id.
340 See supra text accompanying notes 226–40.
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Like the Hatch-Waxman Act, there are imperfections that
need to be resolved in the BPCIA.341 The 180-day notice requirement is just one problem.342 This can extend the exclusivity
period and delay generic entry into the market.343 Only four
biosimilars have been approved by the FDA and no interchangeable biologics have.344 Few manufacturers are likely to pursue
interchangeability due to the higher safety requirements.345 However, biosimilars need to qualify as an interchangeable to receive
the automatic substitutability as generic small-molecule drugs.346
Few incentives exist for the physicians to prescribe a new drug if
there is a fear the patients may react differently to a critical
method of treatment that is only slightly less expensive.347
The market data of the two biosimilars that have entered
the market indicate that biosimilars can reduce the cost of biologic therapies.348 Under the current interpretation of the 180-day
notice requirement and injunctive remedies, this will not happen
quickly.349 Biosimilars are very costly to develop, and if manufacturers will have to face extended periods of litigation, delayed
market entry, and potentially treble damages due to the Federal
Circuit decision in Amgen v. Sandoz, there are few incentives to
pursue biosimilarity.350 This decision is delaying litigation and
the process of biosimilars.351 The case before the Supreme Court
could increase these incentives and achieve the purpose behind
the BPCIA, creating a market for generic biological therapies.352
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EPILOGUE—THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN
AMGEN V. SANDOZ
The Supreme Court announced its decision after the completion of this Note on June 12, 2017.353 As the Note argued, the
Court held that section 262(l)(8)(A) allows the applicant to provide notice before receiving FDA approval, since “the phrase ‘of
the biological product licensed under subsection (k)’ modifies
‘commercial marketing’ rather than ‘notice ....’”354 Thus, the “biosimilar must be ‘licensed’” when the product is marketed, not when
notice is given.355
The Court further held that the requirement under (l)(2)(A)
“is not enforceable by an injunction.”356 Rather, (l)(9)(C) provides
the remedy when the applicant does not provide the application
and manufacturing information required under (l)(2)(A).357 An
“immediate declaratory-judgment action for artificial infringement” may be brought by “the sponsor, [ ] not the applicant.”358
However, the Supreme Court directed the Federal Circuit
on remand to determine “whether an injunction is available under state law to enforce” these requirements.359 Yet, Sandoz filed a
statement at the Federal Circuit to remand the case to the district
court, since the court would be faced with a question of state
law.360 The case is still pending before the Federal Circuit.361
Nonetheless, this Supreme Court decision gives hope for a
biosimilar market since it limits the exclusion period for the
reference product.362 However, as the Note argues, this purpose
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1664 (2017).
Id. at 1668.
355 Id. at 1667.
356 Id.
357 Id. at 1668.
358 Id. at 1667–68.
359 Id. at 1668.
360 Amgen v. Sandoz: Sandoz Requests Remand to District Court, BIG MOLECULE WATCH (June 30, 2017), https://www.bigmoleculewatch.com/2017/06/30
/sandoz-requests-remand/ [https://perma.cc/ZF7Q-MCR8].
361 See, e.g., The Biosimilars Council Supports Sandoz’s Preemption Position
in Federal Circuit Amicus Brief, BIG MOLECULE WATCH (Sept. 15, 2017), https://
www.bigmoleculewatch.com/2017/09/15/biosimilars-council-supports-sandozs
-preemption-position-federal-circuit-amicus-brief/ [https://perma.cc/6LW5-9DNS].
362 See Sandoz Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1670.
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could be furthered if applicants in compliance with (l)(2)(A) do
not need to comply with the 180-day requirement at all, since
the reference sponsor effectively has notice, but that holding is
inconsistent with the current interpretation of the statute and
the current state of the law.363
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